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Environmental and Social Disclosures: Link with Corporate 
Financial Performance 
Abstract:  
Environmental and social disclosures entail costs, yet increasingly, large listed firms 
are making higher and better quality disclosures. In this paper we examine the link 
between a firm’s environmental and social disclosures and its profitability and market 
value. We find that past profitability drives current social disclosures. However, 
consistent with the existing evidence, we do not find any relation between 
environmental disclosures and profitability. Further, while prior literature has largely 
focussed on environmental disclosure, we find that it is the social disclosures that 
matter to investors. We find that firms that make higher social disclosures have 
higher market values. Further analysis reveals that this link is driven by higher 
expected growth rates in the cash flows of such companies. Overall our findings are 
consistent with the resource based view of the firm and the voluntary disclosure 
theory, suggesting that firms with greater economic resources make more extensive 
disclosures which yield net positive economic benefits.  
Keywords:  
environmental disclosures; social disclosures; corporate social responsibility; 
corporate financial performance  
 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
From an economics perspective, producing objective1 environmental (E) and social 
(S) disclosures entail real, proprietary, and opportunity costs (Verrecchia, 1983, 
2001; Li & McConomy, 1999; Cormier & Magnan, 1999, 2003; Buhr, 2002; Brammer 
& Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Armitage & Marston, 2008). Yet, E and S disclosures by large 
listed companies in the UK (as in many countries around the world, Gray Javad, 
Power & Sinclair, 2001) have grown phenomenally over the years, rising from 
approximately a page devoted to employee related disclosure in the 1970s (Gray, 
Kouhy & Lavers, 1995, p. 62) to detailed stand-alone sustainability reports issued by 
many listed companies in recent years. This trend is in line with the growing interest 
in environmental and social issues on the part of a variety of corporate stakeholders 
including socially responsible investors, employees, customers, regulators, 
government (Gray et al., 1995; Cormier & Magnan, 1999, 2003; Gray et al., 2001; 
Deegan, 2004; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Clarkson, Li, Richardson & Vasvari, 
2008, 2011), as well as the wider society via various environmental and social 
activist groups (den Hond & de Bakker, 2007). There is a general consensus in the 
literature2 that larger, more ‘visible’ firms and those operating in more 
environmentally sensitive sectors are likely to make more extensive E and S 
disclosures. However, within this literature, the link between profitability and such 
disclosures remains as yet unclear. 
                                                          
1
 By objective we mean ‘hard’ disclosures as used by Clarkson et al. (2008), which according to them, 
are quantifiable performance indicators.  
2
 See e.g. Freedman & Jaggi (1988), Patten (1991), Gray et al. (1995), Hackston & Milne (1996), 
Gray et al. (2001), Cormier & Magnan (2003), Brammer & Pavelin (2006, 2008), Clarkson et al. 
(2011), and Guidry & Patten (2012). 
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Some scholars, drawing on the socio-political and legitimacy theory based 
arguments posit and find some empirical support for the notion that such disclosures 
are driven primarily by public pressure and are aimed at gaining a ‘license to 
operate’ from the various corporate stakeholders and the wider society (Patten, 
1991, 2002a; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Walden & Schwartz, 1997). Others, 
consistent with the resource based view (RBV) of the firm (Hart, 1995; Russo & 
Fouts, 1997) and the economics based voluntary disclosure theory (VDT), 
(Verrecchia, 1983, 2001) argue that firms with superior environmental and economic 
performance have the incentives and the resources to convey their ‘type’ by making 
more extensive and objective E disclosures. Yet, studies taking this latter view 
provide less than convincing evidence, especially with respect to measures of 
economic performance (see e.g. Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen 
& Hughes, 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011; Guidry & Patten, 2012). In this paper 
we revisit the relation between E and S disclosures and profitability as well as 
investigate the direction of causality, if any, between the two - an issue that prior 
research has identified as meriting attention (Gray et al., 1995, 2001; Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2006, 2008).  
Within the E and S disclosure literature there is also an ongoing debate as to 
whether these disclosures are value-relevant. While some scholars theorise and find 
empirical support for the notion that these disclosures are mainly a ‘legitimation tool’, 
(Gray et al., 1995; Cho & Patten, 2007), others, consistent with the RBV and VDT 
theories, argue and find some empirical support that objective E disclosures are 
value-relevant (see Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Cormier & Magnan, 2007, 2013; 
Clarkson et al., 2011). RBV theorists (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997) argue that 
superior performance in the environmental arena and its effective communication 
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can confer competitive advantages to the firm, including a strong positive reputation. 
Highlighting the importance of communicating the responsible environmental 
strategies of the firm to its external stakeholders, Hart (1995, p.999) states that such 
effective communication could ‘reinforce and differentiate a firm’s position through 
the positive effects of a good reputation.’ Supporting Hart’s (1995) theoretical 
arguments, as well as integrating the legitimacy and VDT based arguments, Cormier 
& Magnan (2013) find that reliable and relevant environmental disclosures not only 
enhance a firm’s environmental legitimacy but also help analysts make better 
earnings forecasts. We extend Cormier & Magnan’s (2013) work by arguing that 
such objective and extensive E (and S) disclosures enhance a firm’s reputation and 
bring economic benefits to the firm, including a higher share price. 
While Cormier & Magnan (2013) focus on E disclosures, we also consider S 
disclosures which to date have received relatively scant attention (Cormier, Ledoux 
& Magnan, 2011). As with E disclosures, more extensive and objective S disclosures 
can enhance a firm’s reputation (Hart, 1995; Armitage & Marston, 2008) which 
should also be valued by investors. We further argue that the competitive 
advantages gained through a strong positive reputation can manifest in the form of 
enhanced ability of the firm to attract and retain higher quality human capital, higher 
customer and supplier loyalty, and increased firm sales. Thus, we argue that the 
effect of such competitive advantages will most likely be reflected in higher growth 
rates of expected cash flows of such firms. Accordingly, we test whether expected 
growth rates of the firms’ cash flows are impacted by E and S disclosures.  
Consistent with the RBV and VDT theory based arguments, we find that more 
profitable firms with financial resource slack make higher S (but not E) disclosures 
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and higher combined E and S disclosures. We also document a positive link 
between S (but not E) disclosures and the firm’s share price. Moreover, we find the 
impact on share price to come through higher implied growth rates in the expected 
cash flows of such firms. While our results are based on the UK’s institutional 
context, these can be of relevance in other institutional settings as well, as we 
discuss later.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature and presents the main hypotheses that we test. Section 3 discusses the 
data, variables and the econometric models. Section 4 presents the results. Section 
5 details the robustness checks and Section 6 concludes. 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
2.1 Environmental and social disclosures and profitability 
While the extent and content of E and S disclosures are believed to vary by time, 
company, industry, and institutional context (Gray et al., 2001; Cormier & Magnan, 
2007), evidence suggests that larger, more publicly visible firms, and those from 
more polluting industries are likely to make higher disclosures (Patten, 1991; Gray et 
al., 1995, 2001; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Adams, Hill & Robert, 1998; Cormier & 
Magnan, 1999, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008).  
Legitimacy theorists argue that E and S disclosures are driven by public pressure 
and are aimed at gaining social legitimacy for a firm’s operations that create 
significant environmental and social impacts (see Patten, 1991, 2002a, 2002b; Gray 
et al., 1995; Hackston & Milne, 1996; Walden & Schwartz, 1997; Cho & Patten, 
2007). This view is articulated well by Patten (1991, pp. 297-298) who argues that 
‘social disclosure is a means of addressing the exposure companies’ face with 
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regard to the social environment’, and that ‘the social legitimacy of business is 
monitored through the public-policy arena rather than the marketplace and, as such, 
the extent of social disclosure should be more closely related to the public pressure 
variables than the profitability measures.’ In the study of the factors driving the social 
disclosures of a sample of Fortune 500 companies, Patten (1991) finds support for 
these arguments. He finds size and industry classifications (which cover the most 
polluting industries) to be the main factors associated with S disclosures. None of the 
profitability measures have a significant association with S disclosures. His 
subsequent studies including Patten (2002a, 2002b) as well as Cho & Patten (2007) 
are also consistent with his previous findings and suggest that, in addition to size 
and industry, poor environmental performance appears to drive higher E disclosures. 
However following the 1991 paper, none of Patten’s later studies focus on S 
disclosures, nor do they include any measures of profitability as determinants of 
disclosure (see Patten, 2002a, 2002b; Cho & Patten, 2007). 
In contrast to the legitimacy perspective, other scholars either implicitly or explicitly 
draw on the RBV theory (Hart, 1995; Russo & Fouts, 1997) and the economics 
based VDT theory (Verrachia, 1983, 2001) and argue that superior environmental 
performers and/or those possessing superior economic resources are likely to make 
higher and better quality i.e. more objective E disclosures (see Cormier & Magnan, 
1999, 2003; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011). However, while 
these studies find a positive link between superior environmental performance and E 
disclosures, the link of the latter with profitability is either not explicitly tested (e.g. Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004) or is found not to be significant (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; 
Clarkson et al., 2008, 2011). Moreover, these studies do not test the relationship of 
profitability with any measures of S disclosures.  
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Despite the lack of any substantive evidence in the literature on (predominantly) E 
disclosures and firm operating performance, one can make a number of theoretical 
arguments as to why one should find a positive link between higher and more 
objective E and S disclosures and firm profitability. First, making ‘hard’ or quantified, 
objective E (and, possibly, S) disclosures entail significant real costs of production as 
they involve putting in place systems for identifying, measuring and reporting such 
information (see Li & McConomy, 1999; Larsen, 2000; Buhr, 2002; Brammer & 
Pavelin, 2008), costs which according to the RBV theory more profitable firms should 
be better able to incur. Second, consistent with the VDT theory, revealing objective 
information about a firm’s environmental and social processes, practices, and 
performance can attract significant proprietary (including regulatory, contractual, and 
reputational) costs (Blacconiere & Patten, 1994; Cormier & Magnan, 1999). For 
example, revealing information about a firm’s environmental technologies, 
environmental and social practices and performance can not only be commercially 
sensitive, but being of interest to regulators, employees and other corporate 
stakeholders (like social and environmental activists groups) can also attract or pre-
empt regulatory, contractual or reputational costs. Hence, as Cormier & Magnan 
(1999) argue, firms with better financial (and environmental / social performance) 
should be more willing to incur these costs. Finally, by making objective disclosures, 
firms incur opportunity costs of lowered future strategic managerial discretion that 
comes from making public commitments to verifiable current and future actions 
(Brammer & Pavelin, 2008, p.122). Hence, based on these arguments, it is 
reasonable to expect that firms with higher profitability and resource slack should 
make more extensive and objective E and S disclosures. Accordingly, we 
hypothesise that: 
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H1: Firms with higher operating profitability will have higher environmental and social 
disclosure scores. 
It is important to note that in the hypothesis above we assume the causality to run 
from profitability to E and S disclosures. However, it is worth noting that concern has 
been raised in the broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) literature about the 
direction of causality between CSR and financial performance, in that superior CSR 
performance could lead to enhanced financial performance and vice-versa 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Within the disclosure literature, 
Brammer & Pavelin (2006, 2008) note the possibility of reverse causality between E 
disclosures and firm profitability, though they do not elaborate on it nor test for it. 
While in motivating H1 we elaborate on the reasons why we believe profitability 
should drive disclosures, it is also entirely plausible to argue that more extensive and 
objective E and S disclosures can enhance a firm’s profitability by building its 
reputation. It can do so, for example, by enabling a firm to attract more capable, 
competent, and productive human capital, by building brand loyalty, and by 
broadening the customer base (Armitage & Marston, 2008). These in fact are the 
arguments we make to motivate H3. Finally, it is also possible that a “virtuous circle” 
exists (Nelling & Web, 2009) and causality, if any, runs in both directions. To date, 
however, the direction of causality remains an open empirical question (Gray et al., 
1995, 2001; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008). In our study, drawing upon Nelling & 
Webb’s (2009) application of Granger causality, we explicitly test for causality 
between our sample firms’ profitability and their E and S disclosures. 
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2.2 Environmental and social disclosures and firm value  
As we have argued above, more extensive and objective E and S disclosures can 
confer competitive advantages to a firm including a strong reputation (Hart, 1995; 
Russo & Fouts, 1997; Armitage & Marston, 2008). Moreover, with increasing societal 
and regulatory pressure, investors are also becoming more interested in E and S 
disclosures of their investee companies (Friedman & Miles, 2001; Cormier & 
Magnan, 2007). It is reasonable then to expect that firms which produce more 
extensive and objective E and S disclosures are likely to be viewed more favourably 
by investors. Thus, consistent with the predictions of the RBV (Hart, 1995; Russo & 
Fouts, 1997) and VDT theory (Verrecchia, 1983, 2001), one can argue that firms that 
make more extensive and objective E and S disclosures are likely to benefit from 
higher share prices. Empirically however, many prior studies find a negative link 
between a firm’s (mainly E) disclosures and its share price performance (e.g. Shane 
& Spicer, 1983; Stevens 1984; Freedman & Patten, 2004; and Lorraine, Collinson & 
Power, 2004). It is important to note though that these studies gauge the stock 
market reaction to mostly negative environmental information which as Aerts, 
Cormier & Magnan (2008) note could be responsible for the negative stock market 
impact documented in the literature. Shane & Spicer (1983) for example study the 
stock market reaction to the negative environmental publicity received by firms which 
feature in the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) reports in the US, while Lorraine 
et al. (2004) focus on the market reaction to publicity about environmental fines and 
environmental awards for a sample of 32 such events. More recent work (Clarkson 
et al., 2011) using a comprehensive and more objective measure of E disclosure, 
however, finds a positive link between such disclosures and the market value of a 
firm.  
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At this point it is worth noting that while E disclosures have been frequently studied, 
S disclosures have received relatively scant attention in this literature. One notable 
exception is the work by Cormier, Aerts, Ledoux & Magnan (2009) who study the 
impact of the precision attribute of social and human capital disclosures on stock 
market information asymmetry as measured by the market value of a firm. They 
argue that because social and human capital are key drivers of firm value, objective 
and more precise voluntary disclosures in these areas are likely to be valued by 
investors. Using a sample of large Canadian firms, they find a positive link between 
the information precision of S disclosures and firm market value.  
Consistent with Cormier et al.’s (2009) findings, we argue that S disclosures are also 
likely to be value-relevant for a number of reasons. First, a strong reputation in the 
social arena, as reflected by more extensive and objective S disclosures (e.g. by 
reporting the firm’s practices in terms of diversity, equality of pay, fair trade etc.), can 
help a firm attract and retain quality employees (Cormier et al., 2011), enhance 
employee morale and hence productivity (Siegel, 2009), and by building good will 
and trust with its key stakeholders, help reduce the firm’s transaction costs (e.g. 
lower employee turnover) and distributional conflicts (e.g. by reporting the firm’s 
practices in terms of diversity, equality of pay, fair trade terms etc.). Hence, objective 
and extensive E and S disclosures should have positive implications for a firm’s 
market value as measured by its share price. Based on these arguments, we 
hypothesise that: 
H2: Firms with higher environmental and social disclosure scores have higher 
market values. 
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2.3 Environmental and social disclosures and firm’s expected cash flows 
The preceding discussion argues that extensive and objective E and S disclosures 
can enhance a firm’s share price, as they help create a positive and strong firm 
reputation as well as other competitive advantages. These advantages can manifest 
in the form of higher sales (by building brand loyalty and expanding customer base), 
lower transaction costs (e.g. by building employee and supplier trust and loyalty) as 
well as lower firm monitoring costs (Stulz, 1999; Cormier et al., 2011). Hence, such 
disclosures can reduce the firm costs as well as bring real economic benefits which 
we argue would enhance the firm’s expected cash flows. To this effect, scholars 
(Cooper, 2006; Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen, 2009) also argue that building good will 
with key stakeholders through effective CSR (and its disclosure) can bring significant 
benefits in the form of reduced cash flow shock when a negative event occurs. 
Based on these arguments, we propose that the effect on market value, of higher E 
and S disclosures is likely to manifest through higher expected growth rates in the 
cash flows of such firms (Clarkson, Guedes & Thompson, 1996). Accordingly, we 
hypothesise that:  
H3: Firms with more extensive environment and social disclosures will have higher 
expected growth rate in cash flows (residual incomes). 
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3. Sample, variables and models 
3.1 Sample 
Our sample consists of the constituents of the FTSE350 index covering the years 
2005-2009. We exclude financial companies3 as these follow a different set of 
environmental and social regulations like the ‘Equator Principles’4 (Macve & Chen, 
2010). This reduces our sample by about a 100 firms each year. Further, based on 
the availability of E and S disclosure scores, we are left with a final sample consisting 
of 11, 87, 165, 214, and 152 firms for the years 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009, 
respectively. In total, these make up 629 firm-year observations. It is worth noting 
though that where we use analysts’ forecasts and research and development (R&D) 
data in our analyses, we lose some observations due to non-availability of this data 
for some firms. We classify industries based on FTSE/DJ single-digit Industry 
Classification Benchmark (ICB) March 2008 version. This leads to 9 single-digit 
industry classifications in our sample: Oil & Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Goods, Health Care, Consumer Services, Telecommunications, Utilities 
and Technology.  
3.2 Variables  
Table 1 describes the variables, their measurement and sources. The financial 
variables are obtained from Datastream. Environmental news data used for 
constructing the media coverage variable is obtained from Nexis@UK. We obtain the 
                                                          
3
 We have analysed a sustainability reports of some financial companies, such as HSBC and 
Barclays, and found their disclosure formats and contents are dramatically different from other non-
financial companies. Thus, financial companies are excluded from this study. 
4
 Equator Principles is a risk management framework adopted by financial institutions for determining, 
assessing and managing environmental and social risk in projects. 
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consensus (mean) analysts’ forecasts of earnings and dividends and the analyst 
coverage data from Thomson Reuters Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES). 
Finally, the E/S/ES performance scores used in some of the analyses are sourced 
from Thomson Reuters Asset 4 database and retrieved from Datastream. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The primary variables of interest in this study are the E and S disclosure scores of 
companies developed by Bloomberg. Bloomberg assigns these scores based on the 
number of data points collected via multiple sources including annual reports, 
standalone sustainability reports and company websites. 86 different data points (60 
environmental and 26 social related) are collected, capturing standardized cross-
sector and industry-specific metrics. Moreover, within each environmental and social 
category, the individual company score is expressed as a percentage, so as to make 
the score comparable across companies. The score is also tailored to be industry-
relevant, so that each company is evaluated only in terms of the data that is relevant 
to its industry sector for example, ‘Phones Recycled’ is only considered in the score 
for telecommunications companies and not for other sectors. Similarly, ‘Gas Flaring’ 
only goes into computing the disclosure score for oil and gas exploration and 
production companies while companies in other sectors are not penalized for not 
disclosing it. The data points are also weighted (using a proprietary weighting 
system), in terms of importance within each category, so that ‘Green House Gas 
emissions’ for example would be weighted more heavily than other data points within 
the environment category. Hence, the scores not only capture the quantity, but also 
the quality of E and S disclosures. A short description of data points covered in each 
score is discussed below. The complete list of the data points collected under the E 
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and S categories is given in Appendix 1. While relatively new in the disclosure 
literature, the Bloomberg disclosure scores have been used in recent studies 
including those by Eccles, Serafeim & Krzus (2011) and Utz & Wimmer (2014).  
The E score covers various types of environmental information that could broadly be 
classified as ‘hard’ items or ‘soft’ items. ‘Hard’ items include quantifiable data like 
Carbon/GHG emissions, energy/water consumption, waste recycled, investments in 
sustainability, and ISO certification, among others. ‘Soft’ items include firms’ 
environmental policies and initiatives such as waste reduction policy, energy 
efficiency policy and green building policy, among others. As can be seen in 
Appendix 1, approximately 80% of E disclosure items covered are ‘hard’ objective 
data items, while only 20% (12 out of 60) are ‘soft’ data points. Thus, these E scores 
largely capture a firm’s ‘hard’ E disclosures, which as Cormier & Magnan (2013) 
argue are likely to enhance a firm’s environmental legitimacy, and as Clarkson et al. 
(2008) argue, are also likely to reflect superior E performance. Also, as Cormier et al. 
(2009) find, such E disclosures are also more likely to reduce the information 
asymmetry between the firm and its investors.  
The S score developed by Bloomberg mostly covers reporting of issues related to 
employee relations, such as employee health and welfare, as well as their training 
and development including training in CSR. The S score also covers disclosure of 
issues of equality and diversity in employment, community spending, and human 
rights. Based on the type of information covered, about 73% of S disclosure score is 
based on ‘hard’ items while ‘soft’ information makes up about 27% of the score (i.e. 7 
out of 26 data points). Therefore, the S disclosure score is also likely to be reflective 
of a firm’s actual social performance. Hence, such S disclosures are also likely to 
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enhance a firm’s social legitimacy, its social reputation and as Cormier et al. (2009) 
argue, help reduce the information asymmetry between the firm and its investors. In 
our analysis, we use the E disclosure score, the S disclosure score and the sum of E 
and S disclosure score which can be interpreted as the firm’s aggregate 
environmental and social (ES) disclosure score.   
3.3 Models 
In the following section we describe the specific models used in our analyses. For 
the profitability analysis, to account for the possibility of reverse causality, we 
develop Equations (1) and (2) based on Nelling & Webb’s (2009) application of 
Granger causality. While Equation (1) specifically tests H1, Equation (2) tests for the 
possibility of reverse causality. Below we discuss each model in detail.  
Disclosure Scoreit= β0+ β1Disclosure Scoreit-1+ β2
Profitability
it
+ β3Profitabilityit-1+  β4Slackit + β5Sizeit + β56Leverageit  
+ β7Financial Activitiesit + β8Strategic Holdingsit+β9Media Exposureit 
+ ∑ β10jINDjit +
j=10
j=1
∑ β11yearjit+
j=2009
j=2005
𝜀𝑖𝑡
 
                                                                                                                                                  (1) 
                
Profitability
it
= β
0
+ β
1
Profitability
it-1
+  β
2
Disclosure Score𝑖𝑡+ β3Disclosure Scoreit-1 + β4Slackit + β5Sizeit +β6Leverageit   
+ β
7
Financial Activitiesit  + β8Strategic Holdingsit+β9Media Exposureit  
+ ∑ β10jINDjit +
j=10
j=1
∑ β11jyearjit+
j=2009
j=2005
𝜀𝑖𝑡
 
                                                                                                                                                  (2)  
In Equation (1), disclosure score (E/S/ES) is a function of lagged disclosure score, 
current profitability, and lagged profitability, while in Equation (2), profitability is a 
function of lagged profitability, and current and lagged disclosure score. If the 
coefficients β2 and β3 are significant in Equation (1), we conclude that firms’ 
profitability ‘Granger causes’ disclosure. Similarly, if the coefficients β2 and β3 in 
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Equation (2) are significant, then we conclude that firms’ disclosure ‘Granger causes’ 
profitability.  
The measure of profitability is return on sales (ROS). The choice of this measure is 
driven by its use in prior related literature (Hart & Ahuja, 1996; Graves & Waddock, 
2000; Callan & Thomas, 2009) as well as by theoretical arguments that the provision 
of voluntary E and S disclosures (being a form of a public good) should strategically 
be tied to the sales of a company (Siegel, 2009, p. 8).  
Following prior literature, we control for firm size (Patten, 1991; Cormier & Magnan, 
1999, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Dhaliwal, Li, Tsang & Yang, 2011), 
leverage (Cormier & Magnan, 1999, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008; Cormier 
et al., 2011), financial activities (Cormier & Magnan, 1999; Dhaliwal et al., 2011), 
media exposure (Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), block 
holdings (Cormier & Magnan, 1999, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), slack (Arora & 
Dharwadkar, 2011), industry (Patten, 1991), and year indicator variables.5  
To test H2, we adapt a model developed in the value-relevance literature and 
implemented in Barth, Clement, Foster & Kasznik (1998). The specific form of the 
model is:  
Pit= β0 + β1BVPSit+β2EPSit+β3Disclosure Scoreit+ β4Performance Scoreit+ β5ROAit+ β6RDPSit+β7Sizeit+β8Leverageit 
+ ∑ β
9j
INDjit+ ∑ β11jyearjit+
j=2009
j=2005
𝜀𝑖𝑡
j=10
j=1
                                                                                                                                                                                                                 (3) 
                                                          
5
 In this analysis we do not include E/S/ES performance scores as controls due to potential 
endogeneity concerns. There is a suggestion in the literature that both E/S/ES disclosure and 
performance could be simultaneously determined by unobserved managerial qualities (see e.g.  Al-
Tujawari et al. (2004) and Clarkson et al. (2008 and 2011). 
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In Equation (3), Pit is the firm i’s share price at time t. BVPSit is the book value per share, 
EPSit is earnings per share and disclosure score is either the E/S or ES score for firm i 
in year t. In (3) we also include E/S/ES performance score, proxies for firm size, 
profitability, and leverage as control variables. In addition, we control for the effect of 
intangibles on firm value using R&D expenditure per share. Given that disclosure 
scores and performance scores may be correlated, we check for any potential 
multicollinearity issues using variance inflation factors and find it not to be the case.  
To test H3, we use a model based on Lee, Myers & Swaminathan (1999) as in (4) 
below: 
 pt = bt + ∑
(FROEt+τ − re)
(1 + re)
bt+τ−l +
(FROEn − re)bn−1(1 + g)
(re − g)(1 + re)n
n
τ=1
                                                                                                       (4) 
In Equation (4), g is the long run growth rate of `residual incomes’ from year n 
onwards, FROEt+τ is the forecasted return on equity for period t + τ, computed as 
forecast 
EPSt + τ
BVPSt + τ − 1
, where 𝐸𝑃𝑆t + τ is the forecasted EPS and BVPSt + τ − 1 is the book 
value of equity per share for period t +  τ –  1. Since analyst forecasts for UK firms 
are most complete for forecast periods up to two years ahead, in our implementation 
of (4) we restrict n to 2. To estimate the cost of equity capital, re, required in (4) we 
mainly follow Gregory, Tharyan & Whittaker (2013). Gregory et al. (2013) note that 
the cost of capital differences between firms are driven mainly by industry effects 
and therefore we use the industry cost of capital as a proxy for the firm’s cost of 
capital. To arrive at the industry cost of capital, we first calculate industry betas each 
month using the previous 60 months of returns, by regressing industry returns on 
market returns. Then, we use these estimated rolling betas in a simple capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM) framework to arrive at a time-varying cost of capital each 
month. Specifically, the industry cost of capital is calculated as rf + (industry beta x 
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the market risk premium) where rf is the 3 month UK treasury bill rate (the risk-free 
rate) and the market risk premium is assumed to be 4.3% and is based on estimates 
from Dimson (2011).6 For each industry, these monthly measures are averaged over 
each year to arrive at a cost of capital measure for that year. Having estimated re, 
Equation (4) allows us to solve for the long run growth rate (g) that is implied by the 
share price (pt) by using analysts’ earnings forecasts, the forecasted book values 
estimated using the clean surplus relation, and the estimated cost of equity capital 
(re). Once we estimate the growth rates, we analyse the impact of E/S/ES disclosure 
scores on the long run implied growth rates by a regression of the growth rate g on 
the E/S/ES scores and control variables including E/S/ES performance score, 
profitability (ROA), a proxy for firm size (Weir, Lang & McKnight, 2002; Lo & Sheu, 
2007), leverage (Weir et al., 2002), R&D expenditure, and indicator variables for 
industry membership. As in previous analysis, we again check for potential 
collinearity between disclosure and performance scores, using variance inflation 
factors, and find it not to be a problem. The specific model is as follows:  
g
it
=β0+ β1
Disclosure Scoreit + β2Performance Scoreit +  β3RDPSit + β4ROAit + β5Sizeit + β6Leverageit 
+ ∑ β
7j
INDjit+
j=10
j=1
∑ β11jyearjit+
j=2009
j=2005
𝜀𝑖𝑡
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          (5) 
where git (grate) is the long run implied growth rate of residual income.  
4. Results 
Table 2 shows that the S disclosure has a mean score of 32% and E disclosure of 
21%. This suggests that on average our sample of firms make more extensive S 
disclosures than E disclosures. Consistent with this pattern, the average E 
                                                          
6
 As in Gregory et al. (2013), we undertake a sensitivity analysis by assuming a range of values (3%-
5%) consistent with the Dimson (2011) estimates and our results are robust. 
19 
 
performance score is also slightly lower than the S performance score. The average 
slack (which is the natural log of the sum of cash and short term investments and 
accounts receivables) is 6, equivalent to the mean value of £403 million. Average 
ROS is 12%, while the mean value of lagged ROS is 14%. Average size measured 
as natural log of employee number is 9.32 (i.e. about 11,159 employees) and natural 
logarithm of net sales is 14.39, i.e. approximately £8 billion. The average leverage 
i.e. total debt to total assets ratio is 25%. The mean values of block shareholdings 
(i.e. shareholdings of 5% or more, Datastream classification) and financial activities 
(new equity raised as a percentage of total assets) are 19% and 2%, respectively. 
The mean of the log of media exposure is 1.5. In other words, the average number of 
environmental news related to a firm in one year is about 5. On average, there are 
13 analysts issuing earnings forecasts for a firm in a year. The average book value 
per share (BVPS), earnings per share (EPS) and R&D expenditure per share 
(RDPS) are £5.26, £0.39 and £0.04 respectively.  
[Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
As can be seen in Table 3, there is a high correlation among all disclosure scores 
and their lagged values, which suggests the stickiness of these scores across years. 
It seems that once a firm starts reporting in a particular area, it continues to do so in 
subsequent periods, consistent with the costs of commitment argument. The positive 
and significant correlation of 0.56 between E disclosure and E performance scores 
and 0.45 between S disclosure and S performance scores is consistent with the VDT 
theory view that companies with better E/S/ES performance have the incentives to 
convey their ‘type’ by making more extensive and objective disclosures.  When size 
is measured as log sales, there is a relatively high correlation between firm size and 
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slack (0.86), and firm size and media exposure (0.62), suggesting that bigger and 
more publicly visible firms have greater financial slack. As expected, we find a high 
correlation of book value per share (0.50) and of earnings per share (0.82) with 
market price per share , suggesting that both are highly value-relevant. We now turn 
to the results of the tests of our hypotheses.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the results of testing H1 and the reverse causality test with respect to 
disclosure scores and firm profitability. While we do not find any evidence of 
causality running from disclosures to profitability, consistent with H1 we find 
evidence of causality from lagged profitability to S and combined ES disclosure 
scores. This finding suggests that firms which have some track record of being 
profitable have the resources and the willingness to commit to investments in the 
social arena. Contrary to say pollution abatement expenditures, investments in 
stakeholders like employees entail longer term commitments (for example, decisions 
to improve pay conditions or health and safety conditions cannot be reversed easily). 
Our findings suggest that firms would be willing to enter into such commitments and 
publicly disclose these only if they have the economic means to do so, hence the link 
of lagged profitability with S disclosures. This finding is also consistent with prior UK 
evidence, which shows that over the years, companies have enhanced their 
stakeholder engagement, especially with respect to their employees (Gray et al., 
1995).  
In terms of the control variables, we find that after controlling for lagged values of the 
dependent variable, all control variables other than size lose their explanatory power. 
This finding leads one to question the cross sectional findings of previous research 
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and highlights the importance of controlling for lagged values of disclosure in such 
analyses (consistent with the costs of commitment argument). We now turn to the 
issue of value-relevance of E and S disclosures (H2). Table 5 presents the 
regression results of testing H2.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
Consistent with H2, we find a positive and significant association between the overall 
ES disclosure and the firm’s stock price. At a disaggregated level, we find similar 
results for S disclosure, though not for E disclosure. In some ways, this finding is 
quite surprising, given the preponderance in the literature of the capital market 
implications of environmental performance and environmental disclosures. Our 
findings suggest that while the academia has focused more on environmental issues 
in CSR research, it is social issues that matter more to investors.  As we also control 
for S performance, the implication of our results is that S disclosure has an impact on 
firm value over and beyond that of S performance. While novel in this stream of 
academic research, this finding is consistent with Renneboog, Horst & Zhang’s 
(2008) analysis which shows that social along with governance screen forms the 
single largest category for picking stocks by the socially responsible investment 
(SRI) sector around the world. Our analysis illustrates that this trend may not be 
limited to the SRI sector alone. It seems that investors in general now place a 
relatively higher value on firms who are seen to better address their social 
responsibilities towards their stakeholders, particularly their employees (Bloomberg 
social disclosure score covers largely the issues related to employees). Theoretical 
arguments for CSR also focus on employees (Heal, 2005; Siegel, 2009) and 
anecdotal evidence also suggests that prominent distributional conflicts between 
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business and its stakeholders have been related to employee issues, well-known 
examples being Wal-Mart and Nike (see Heal, 2005, for further details). It appears 
that investors in general have become sensitized to how a business addresses its 
responsibility towards this key stakeholder, placing higher value on firms which are 
seen to be more concerned about their relations with this important stakeholder.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Table 6 shows the results for the test of H3. Consistent with the positive impact 
of S disclosure on firm value, the long run implied growth rates in residual 
income are also positively and significantly associated with S and the combined 
ES disclosures scores, but not with E disclosure scores. Again as we control for 
actual E and S performance in this analysis, the result implies that disclosure 
has an impact on the long run implied growth rates beyond that of performance. 
This result further strengthens our earlier argument that more extensive S 
disclosures that reflect the firm’s strong commitment to employees and other 
stakeholders generate competitive advantages which investors expect to have a 
positive impact on the growth rate of the firm’s future cash flows. 
5. Additional analyses and robustness checks 
In our analysis of the impact of disclosure on firm value, it is possible that any 
observed effect is via the discount rate or the cost of equity capital. Although, we do 
not have a formal hypothesis regarding the cost of capital effects, given its 
importance in the disclosure literature (Verrecchia, 2001; Botosan, 2006; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011) we run regressions similar to Equation (5), but with the implied cost of 
capital (reit) estimate as the dependent variable. The specific form of the regression 
we run is:  
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reit=β0+ β1Disclosureit + β2RDPSit + β3ROAit + β4SIZEit + β5Leverageit + ∑ β6jINDjit+
j=10
j=1 εit                    (6)  
Where, reit is the cost of equity capital. In contrast to the results on the growth rate, 
we find no significant relationship between the disclosure scores and the cost of 
equity capital (hence, in the interest of brevity, we do not report these).  
In our analysis as described earlier, to arrive at the implied growth rate of residual 
income, we assumed the cost of capital was the same for all the firms within the 
same industry.  As a robustness check, we use each firm’s price to earnings growth 
(PEG) estimated using its two year ahead (eps2) and one year ahead analyst 
forecast (eps1) of earnings and current prices (P0), 𝑟𝑒𝑃𝐸𝐺 = √(𝑒𝑝𝑠2 − 𝑒𝑝𝑠1)/𝑃0 as an 
alternative measure of its cost of equity capital (Easton, 2004; Botosan & Plumlee, 
2005). Our conclusions remain unchanged.  
We also conduct further tests on the link between profitability and E and S disclosure 
by considering ROE, which although not widely used in the non-financial disclosure 
literature, is commonly used in the CSR performance literature (see e.g. Hart & 
Ahuja, 1996; Callan & Thomas, 2009). We also use ROA as an additional measure 
(see e.g. Cormier & Magnan, 2003; Brammer & Pavelin, 2006, 2008). Consistent with 
prior evidence, we do not find a link between either of the measures and E and S 
disclosures.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we examine the link between E and S disclosures of a firm and its 
profitability and market value. The profitability analysis reveals a positive link 
between lagged profitability and current S disclosures. It appears that firms with 
some track record of profitability have the ability and the willingness to invest in 
stakeholder engagement practices as evidenced by higher and objective S 
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disclosures. We however find no evidence of reverse causality, i.e. one running from 
lagged disclosures to profitability. Perhaps it takes a longer time for the effects of a 
good reputation built up through extensive and objective voluntary disclosures 
(Armitage & Marston, 2008) to translate into superior profits. As longer time series 
data become available, future research can revisit this issue.  
Our market value analysis reveals that investors also care about S disclosures. On 
one hand, this finding may be regarded as unique to UK’s institutional context given 
the historical importance of social issues in UK’s political economy. Gray et al. 
(1995) suggest that extensive S disclosures may be an attempt by the organization 
to gain the ‘approval’ from the powerful social and political stakeholders in UK’s 
society, which investors as capitalists would also care about.7 On the other hand, 
this evidence is also consistent with emerging findings which show that globally 
investors now care about a firm’s social performance (see Marsat and Williams, 
2014). Finally, this finding mirrors the value attached to social screens by the global 
SRI sector (Renneboog et al., 2008) and is also consistent with the predictions of 
scholars (Friedman & Miles, 2001) that mainstream investors would in future care 
about the social reputations of their investee firms.  
Our finding of no link between E disclosures and firm value while perplexing could be 
attributable to a number of reasons. First, it could be due to the nature of the 
disclosure score. Many prior studies mostly gauge the reaction to negative 
environmental news (e.g. Shane and Spicer, 1984; Lorraine et al., 2004). As 
Bloomberg score covers all types of E disclosures, both positive and negative, the 
                                                          
7
 See Gray et al. (1995) for a comprehensive discussion of the origins, patterns and contents of social 
disclosures in the UK.  
25 
 
score could be a noisy measure of the firm’s underlying environmental performance. 
Second, prior evidence is usually limited to the environmentally sensitive sectors 
where environmental performance and its related disclosure would matter to 
investors as it would have real cash flow implications, in terms of environmental 
fines, remediation and prevention costs, etc. (e.g. Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; Clarkson 
et al., 2011). Finally, even if objective and extensive E disclosures reflect superior 
underlying E performance, whether investors care about E disclosures and even E 
performance across the cross-section of industries remains an open question (given 
the mixed results on the link, see Aggarwal, 2013 for a recent review). Our findings 
also suggest that across industries, it is the social performance and its disclosure 
that matters to investors, as these may help firms reap real economic benefits. Our 
finding of expected growth rate of cash flows as the driver of the stock prices of high 
S disclosure firms further supports this last assertion. Overall, these results are 
consistent with the predictions of both the RBV and the VDT theory. In the context of 
these theories, such disclosures can be seen as part of the overall competitive 
strategy of the firm, aimed at bringing both non-financial as well as financial rewards. 
Our study has some limitations as well as future research implications. One limitation 
of these findings is that they relate to the largest UK companies. Future work could 
investigate the disclosure practices, their determinants and their economic 
consequences for smaller firms. This is important as our profitability analysis 
suggests that any future regulation in this area may have different economic 
implications for small and large firms. A second possible limitation is that our findings 
relate to the institutional context in the UK. While some scholars argue that 
institutional differences like the nature of the reporting regime (e.g. more voluntary 
versus more rule-based) can lead to varying consequences for disclosures (Leuz & 
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Verrecchia, 2000; Cormier & Magnan, 2007), others argue that as capital markets 
integrate across countries ‘corporate disclosure strategies seem to be determined in 
a similar way, irrespective of a given country’s socio-cultural environment’ (Cormier 
& Magnan, 2003, p. 58). While E and S disclosures are largely voluntary around the 
world, it would be interesting to test the results of this study in diverse institutional 
settings. Finally, while our findings shed some light on the importance of S 
disclosures, future research can verify whether these results are unique to UK or 
whether globally corporations and their investors now care about S disclosures.  
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Table 1: Variable definitions, measurement and sources 
Category Measure Definition/Measurement Source 
Environment 
and social 
disclosures 
E Environmental score (60 environmental data points adjusted by 
industry and weighted by importance) ranges from 0 to 100 as 
percentage.  
Bloomberg 
S  Social score (26 social data points adjusted by industry and 
weighted by importance) ranges from 0 to 100 as percentage. 
Bloomberg 
Environment 
and social 
performance 
A4E  A4E is the Environmental and A4S is the Social performance 
score. Asset 4 collects data from sources such as 
sustainability/CSR reports, annual reports, company websites, 
proxy filings etc. For each company, over 750 data points are 
collected, these are combined into over 250 key performance 
indicators (KPIs). These KPIs are integrated into 18 categories 
and grouped within four pillars: Economic; environment; Social 
and Corporate Governance. The scores are normalized using z-
scoring (lies between 0 and 100%), equally weighted and 
benchmarked against the complete universe of companies. All 
the individual data points, KPI, category, pillar and overall scores 
are available. A4E and A4S are the environmental and social 
pillar scores. Further information can be found here 
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/ASSET4%20ESG/Index.htm 
Thomson Reuters 
Asset4 A4S 
Slack Slack Slack resources – natural logarithm of the sum of cash & short-
term investments (02001) and total receivables (02051) 
Datastream 
 
 
Operating  
Profitability 
ROA Return on assets – the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(18191) to total assets (02999) at the beginning of the year i.e. 
EBITt/TAt-1 
Datastream 
 
ROE 
Return on equity (DWRE) - the ratio of net income before 
preferred dividends minus preferred dividend requirement to last 
year's common equity. The calculation differs from Worldscope. 
Datastream data is based on the current period, and Worldscope 
is an average of prior and current period Equity. 
 
Datastream 
ROS Return on sales – the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(18191) to net sales (01001) 
Datastream 
 
Firm Size 
 
Size_emp Size – natural logarithm of employee number (07011) Datastream 
Size_sales Size – natural logarithm of net sales (01001) Datastream 
Other firm 
characteristics 
 
Leverage Leverage - Total debt (03255) divided by total assets (02999) Datastream 
Fin_acts Financial activities - the ratio of net proceeds from sale/issue of 
common and/or preferred stock (04251) during the year divided 
by total assets (02999) at the beginning of the year. 
Datastream 
 
Media 
Media exposure – natural logarithm of the number of 
environmental news exposed. It is obtained by searching 
company’s name and any one of the terms ‘environment 
sustainability’, ‘waste management’, ‘pollution’ and 
‘environmental award’ within all English language news published 
over the world. Specific date for each year is from 1 January 
200X to 31 December 200X.  
 
Nexis@UK 
Str_holds Strategic holdings - the percentage of total shares in issue held 
strategically and not available to ordinary shareholders 
(NOSHST). Holdings of 5% or more are counted as strategic. 
Datastream 
RDPS Research and Development Expenditure per Share-Research 
and Development (01201) divided by the number of shares 
outstanding (05301).  
Datastream 
 BVPS Book Value per share- price of the company on its books (03501) 
divided by the number of shares outstanding (05301). 
Datastream 
 EPS Earnings per share – Net Income (01751) divided by the number 
of shares outstanding (05301). 
Datastream 
 Price End of June Price – (P) Datastream 
Capital market AnaRec Analyst coverage - number of analysts issuing earnings forecasts 
for the firm. 
IBES 
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 Analysts 
forecast 
EPS 
Analyst Mean Forecast of EPS, 1 and 2 years ahead IBES 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the sample. E is the environmental disclosure score, S is 
the social disclosure score and ES is the sum of environmental and social disclosure scores. Et_1, 
St_1 and ESt_1: are the one year lagged E, S and ES scores respectively. ROSt_1 is the one year 
lagged ROS. A4E, A4S and A4ES are the E, S and ES performance scores. All other variables are as 
defined in Table 1. IQR is the inter quartile range. 
 
Variable  Mean Median  SD IQR 
E 21.27 19.38 12.19 18.60 
S 31.64 28.07 11.78 15.79 
ES 52.91 49.41 21.37 31.46 
A4E 65.69 72.77 24.21 39.27 
A4S 68.79 73.41 22.67 34.47 
A4ES 134.47 144.71 43.25 63.60 
Et_1 21.63 20.16 12.26 18.60 
St_1 32.18 28.07 12.06 19.30 
ESt_1 54.09 50.99 21.58 31.62 
Q-ratio 1.83 1.51 1.36 0.90 
Slack 6.00 5.86 1.38 1.82 
ROE 0.23 0.18 0.38 0.21 
ROA 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 
ROS 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.12 
ROSt_1 0.14 0.12 0.14 0.13 
Size_emp 9.32 9.32 1.49 1.91 
Size_sales 14.39 14.26 1.31 1.81 
Leverage 0.25 0.23 0.17 0.26 
Fin_acts 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.01 
Str_holds 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.20 
Media 1.47 1.10 1.44 2.40 
AnaRec 13.46 13.00 5.87 8.00 
Price 5.19 3.86 4.44 4.83 
BVPS 1.95 1.42 1.63 1.76 
EPS 0.38 0.28 0.33 0.32 
RDPS 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.02 
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Table 3: Pair-wise correlation matrix 
Table 3 reports the pairwise correlations between the variables. 1:E; 2:S; 3:ES; 4:A4E, 5:A4S, 6:A4ES; 7:Et_1; 8:St_1; 9:ESt_1; 10:Qratio; 11:Slack; 12: ROE; 
13:ROA; 14:ROS; 15:ROSt_1; 16:Size_emp; 17:Size_sales; 18:Leverage; 19:Fin_acts; 20:Str_Holds;21:Media; 22:Analyst Coverage; 23:price; 24:BVPS; 
25:EPS; 26:RDPS. All the variables are as defined in Table 1 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1 1.00 
                         
2 0.58 1.00 
                        
3 0.89 0.88 1.00 
                       
4 0.54 0.38 0.52 1.00 
                      
5 0.56 0.45 0.57 0.75 1.00 
                     
6 0.58 0.44 0.58 0.94 0.93 1.00 
                    
7 0.84 0.54 0.78 0.59 0.55 0.61 1.00 
                   
8 0.56 0.86 0.80 0.41 0.46 0.46 0.57 1.00 
                  
9 0.79 0.79 0.89 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.89 0.88 1.00 
                 
10 0.00 0.05 0.03 -0.15 -0.01 -0.09 0.01 0.05 0.04 1.00 
                
11 0.40 0.55 0.53 0.46 0.49 0.51 0.44 0.56 0.56 -0.09 1.00 
               
12 0.13 0.03 0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.09 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.04 1.00 
              
13 0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.18 -0.08 -0.14 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.47 -0.04 0.42 1.00 
             
14 0.08 0.05 0.07 -0.09 -0.03 -0.07 0.05 0.13 0.10 0.24 0.07 0.27 0.66 1.00 
            
15 0.04 0.06 0.05 -0.09 -0.07 -0.08 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.21 -0.01 0.05 0.25 0.44 1.00 
           
16 0.33 0.33 0.37 0.41 0.50 0.49 0.33 0.32 0.36 -0.18 0.64 0.10 -0.05 -0.11 -0.24 1.00 
          
17 0.45 0.48 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.59 0.48 0.49 0.55 -0.20 0.86 0.03 -0.06 -0.03 -0.12 0.81 1.00 
         
18 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.07 0.11 -0.18 0.15 0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.14 0.22 0.18 1.00 
        
19 0.12 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.12 0.07 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.09 -0.02 0.03 0.00 0.10 0.05 0.06 0.05 1.00 
       
20 -0.28 -0.27 -0.31 -0.37 -0.34 -0.38 -0.32 -0.31 -0.35 -0.04 -0.38 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15 -0.12 -0.22 -0.31 -0.17 -0.10 1.00 
      
21 0.35 0.44 0.44 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.38 0.47 0.48 -0.03 0.58 0.07 0.04 0.13 0.09 0.43 0.62 0.25 -0.06 -0.29 1.00 
     
22 0.39 0.39 0.44 0.31 0.48 0.42 0.35 0.38 0.41 0.08 0.46 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.49 0.59 0.18 -0.03 -0.30 0.47 1.00 
    
23 0.26 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.34 0.27 0.34 0.33 0.34 0.30 0.13 0.22 0.02 0.10 -0.24 0.16 0.14 1.00 
   
24 0.14 -0.04 0.06 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.12 -0.28 0.10 -0.13 -0.11 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.13 -0.11 0.03 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.50 1.00 
  
25 0.27 0.10 0.21 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.28 0.17 0.26 0.08 0.25 0.34 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.17 0.28 0.08 0.06 -0.25 0.16 0.10 0.82 0.57 1.00 
 
26 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.15 0.16 0.05 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.13 0.09 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.18 1.00 
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Table 4: Link between disclosures and profitability 
 
Table 4 reports the results of testing hypothesis 1 and reverse causality between disclosures and 
profitability. The industries classification is based on FTSE/DJ single-digit Industry Classification 
Benchmark (ICB). All the variables are as defined in Table 1.Tobit specifications are used when the 
dependent variable is E, S or ES disclosure scores (Equations 2 and 3). OLS regressions are used 
when the dependent variable is ROS. All variables are as defined in table 1. The t-statistics using 
standard errors clustered by firm and year are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicates significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
E ROS S ROS ES ROS 
Envt_1 0.884*** 0.002 
    
 
(28.46) (0.41) 
    
E 
 
0.001 
    
  
(0.93) 
    
St_1 
  
0.863*** 0.003 
  
   
(24.85) (1.53) 
  
S 
   
-0.005 
  
    
(-1.64) 
  
Est_1 
    
0.925*** 0.002 
     
(36.10) (1.06) 
ES 
     
-0.001 
      
(-1.11) 
ROS 0.473 
 
-1.585 
 
-1.223 
 
 
(0.82) 
 
(-1.40) 
 
(-1.19) 
 
ROSt_1 0.765 0.127 0.909* 0.139 1.662** 0.136 
 
(0.98) (0.88) (1.69) (1.03) (2.41) (1.00) 
Slack -0.491 0.014 0.130 0.019 -0.462 0.015 
 
(-1.15) (0.91) (0.30) (1.13) (-0.70) (0.90) 
Size_emp 1.046*** -0.054 0.691* -0.042 1.472*** -0.047 
 
(2.92) (-1.50) (1.89) (-1.51) (2.77) (-1.37) 
Leverage 0.930 0.081 2.288 0.098** 1.965 0.0762 
 
(0.49) (1.63) (1.32) (2.27) (0.71) (1.58) 
Fin_acts 3.327 -0.092 -4.29 -0.136 -0.585 -0.092 
 
(0.64) (-0.64) (-1.29) (-0.97) (-0.09) (-0.63) 
Str_holds -0.598 0.094 1.634 0.073 1.454 0.083 
 
(-0.27) (0.75) (0.96) (0.76) (0.49) (0.79) 
Media 
0.056 0.006 -0.333 0.009 -0.377 0.006 
 
(0.17) (0.66) (-1.09) (0.76) (-0.74) (0.69) 
Intercept -2.057 0.635 0.601 0.657* -2.087 0.657 
 
(-0.82) (1.64) (0.27) (1.86) (-0.60) (1.54) 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.198 0.170 0.224 0.172 0.220 0.162 
F-Statistic 102.30*** 9.31*** 141.27*** 9.77*** 184.68*** 9.32*** 
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Table 5: Impact of E / S / ES disclosures on market value 
 
Table 5 reports the results of testing hypothesis 2, relating to the effect of disclosure on stock price. 
The industry classification is based on FTSE/DJ single-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). 
All variables are as defined in Table 1. The t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and 
year are shown in parenthesis. *,** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
price price price 
Bvps 0.232** 0.265*** 0.242** 
 
(2.21) (2.85) (2.37) 
Eps 9.449*** 9.435*** 9.415*** 
 
(5.60) (5.66) (5.59) 
E 0.018 
  
 
(1.27) 
  A4E -0.008 
  
 
(-1.38) 
  S 
 
0.026** 
 
  
(2.06) 
 A4S 
 
0.018*** 
 
  
(2.67) 
 ES 
  
0.013** 
   
(2.59) 
A4ES 
  
0.002 
   
(1.27) 
ROA 5.649*** 6.184*** 5.996*** 
 
(3.18) (3.00) (3.06) 
Rdps 3.478* 3.436* 3.406* 
 
(1.80) (1.88) (1.77) 
Size_sales 0.094 -0.196** -0.063 
 
(1.01) (-1.99) (-0.75) 
Leverage 0.937 0.849 0.969 
 
(1.57) (1.31) (1.56) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept 2.470** 3.940*** 3.383*** 
 
(2.29) (2.84) (2.71) 
R-squared 0.693 0.702 0.695 
F 34.94*** 31.94*** 33.10*** 
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Table 6: Impact of E / S / ES disclosure on growth rates  
 
Table 6 Reports the results of testing hypothesis 3, which relates to the effect of disclosure on the 
growth rates. git (grate) is the implied long run growth rate of Residual Income. The industry 
classification is based on FTSE/DJ single-digit Industry Classification Benchmark (ICB). All variables 
are as defined in Table1. The t-statistics using standard errors clustered by firm and year are shown 
in parenthesis. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
grate grate grate 
E 0.001 
  
 
(0.74) 
  A4E 0.000 
  
 
(0.25) 
  S 
 
0.002*** 
 
  
(3.56) 
 A4S 
 
-0.000 
 
  
(-1.24) 
 ES 
  
0.001* 
   
(1.88) 
A4ES 
  
-0.000 
   
(-1.08) 
Rdps 0.0308 0.0324 0.0335 
 
(1.16) (1.28) (1.27) 
ROA -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.076** 
 
(-2.81) (-2.62) (-2.56) 
Size_sales -0.005** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
(-2.38) (-3.15) (-2.78) 
Leverage 0.007 0.013 0.010 
 
(0.22) (0.40) (0.34) 
Intercept 0.138*** 0.122*** 0.140*** 
 (6.20) (5.12) (6.93) 
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.285 0.304 0.298 
F 20.26*** 18.70*** 19.40*** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40 
 
Appendix 1: E and S indicators with Bloomberg fields 
Environmental  
  
Direct CO2 Emissions DIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Indirect CO2 Emissions INDIRECT_CO2_EMISSIONS 
Travel Emissions TRAVEL_EMISSIONS 
Total CO2 Emissions TOTAL_CO2_EMISSIONS 
CO2 Intensity (Tonnes) CO2_INTENSITY 
CO2 Intensity per Sales CO2_INTENSITY_PER_SALES 
GHG Scope 1 GHG_SCOPE_1 
GHG Scope 2 GHG_SCOPE_2 
GHG Scope 3 GHG_SCOPE_3 
Total GHG Emissions TOTAL_GHG_EMISSIONS 
NOx Emissions NOX_EMISSIONS 
SO2 Emissions SO2_EMISSIONS 
SOx Emissions SULPHUR_OXIDE_EMISSIONS 
VOC Emissions VOC_EMISSIONS 
CO Emissions CARBON_MONOXIDE_EMISSIONS 
Methane Emissions METHANE_EMISSIONS 
ODS Emissions ODS_EMISSIONS 
Particulate Emissions PARTICULATE_EMISSIONS 
Total Energy Consumption ENERGY_CONSUMPTION 
Electricity Used (MWh) ELECTRICITY_USED 
Renewable Energy Use RENEW_ENERGY_USE 
Water Consumption WATER_CONSUMPTION 
Water/Unit of Prod (in Liters) WATER_PER_UNIT_OF_PROD 
% Water Recycled PCT_WATER_RECYCLED 
Discharges to Water DISCHARGE_TO_WATER 
Waste Water (Th Cubic Meters) WASTE_WATER 
Hazardous Waste HAZARDOUS_WASTE 
Total Waste TOTAL_WASTE 
Waste Recycled WASTE_RECYCLED 
Paper Consumption PAPER_CONSUMPTION 
Paper Recycled PAPER_RECYCLED 
Fuel Used (Th Liters) FUEL_USED 
Raw Materials Used RAW_MAT_USED 
% Recycled Materials PCT_RECYCLED_MATERIALS 
Gas Flaring GAS_FLARING 
Number of Spills NUMBER_SPILLS 
Amount of Spills (Th Tonnes) AMOUNT_OF_SPILLS 
Nuclear % Total Energy NUCLEAR_%_ENERGY 
Solar % Total Energy SOLAR_%_ENERGY 
Phones Recycled PHONES_RECYCLED 
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Environmental Fines # NUM_ENVIRON_FINES 
Environmental Fines $ ENVIRON_FINES_AMT 
ISO 14001 Certified Sites ISO_14001_SITES 
Number of Sites NUMBER_OF_SITES 
% Sites Certified %_SITES_CERTIFIED 
Environmental Accounting Cost ENVIRONMENTAL_ACCTG_COST 
Investments in Sustainability INVESTMENTS_IN_SUSTAINABILITY 
Energy Efficiency Policy ENERGY_EFFIC_POLICY 
Emissions Reduction Initiatives EMISSION_REDUCTION 
Environmental Supply Chain Management ENVIRON_SUPPLY_MGT 
Green Building Policy GREEN_BUILDING 
Waste Reduction Policy WASTE_REDUCTION 
Sustainable Packaging SUSTAIN_PACKAGING 
Environmental Quality Management Policy ENVIRON_QUAL_MGT 
Climate Change Policy CLIMATE_CHG_POLICY 
New Products - Climate Change CLIMATE_CHG_PRODS 
Biodiversity Policy BIODIVERSITY_POLICY 
Environmental Awards Received ENVIRONMENTAL_AWARDS_RECEIVED 
Verification Type VERIFICATION_TYPE 
 
Social   
Number of Employees NUMBER_EMPLOYEES_CSR 
Employee Turnover % EMPLOYEE_TURNOVER_PCT 
% Employees Unionized PCT_EMPLOYEES_UNIONIZED 
Employee Average Age EMPLOYEE_AVERAGE_AGE 
% Women in Workforce PCT_WOMEN_EMPLOYEES 
% Women in Mgt PCT_WOMEN_MGT 
% Minorities in Workforce PCT_MINORITY_EMPLOYEES 
% Disabled in Workforce PCT_DISABLED_IN_WORKFORCE 
% Minorities in Mgt PCT_MINORITY_MGT 
Workforce Accidents WORK_ACCIDENTS_EMPLOYEES 
Lost Time from Accidents LOST_TIME_ACCIDENTS 
Lost Time Incident Rate LOST_TIME_INCIDENT_RATE 
Fatalities – Contractors FATALITIES_CONTRACTORS 
Fatalities – Employees FATALITIES_EMPLOYEES 
Fatalities – Total FATALITIES_TOTAL 
Community Spending COMMUNITY_SPENDING 
Employee Training Cost EMPLOYEE_TRAINING_COST 
SRI Assets Under Management SRI_ASSETS_UNDER_MANAGEMENT 
# Awards Received AWARDS_RECEIVED 
Health and Safety Policy HEALTH_SAFETY_POLICY 
Fair Remuneration Policy FAIR_REMUNERATION_POLICY 
Training Policy TRAINING_POLICY 
Employee CSR Training EMPLOYEE_CSR_TRAINING 
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Equal Opportunity Policy EQUAL_OPPORTUNITY_POLICY 
Human Rights Policy HUMAN_RIGHTS_POLICY 
UN Global Compact Signatory UN_GLOBAL_COMPACT_SIGNATORY 
 
 
 
 
 
